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Project management between will and representation 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper challenges some deep-rooted assumptions of project management. Inspired by the 
work of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, it calls for looking at projects through 
two complementary lenses: one that accounts for cognitive and representational aspects and one 
that accounts for material and volitional aspects. Understanding the many ways in which these 
aspects transpire and interact in projects sheds new light on project organizations, as imperfect 
and fragile representations that chase a shifting nexus of intractable human, social, technical and 
material processes. This, in turn, can bring a new grasp of notions such as value, knowledge, 
complexity and risk. 
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Introduction 
 
From building transportation infrastructures such as bridges and airports to designing airplanes 
and dispatching exploration missions in space, from creating information and communication 
systems to editing videogames and other software products, and from developing new medical 
drugs to organizing vaccination programs, complex projects are an essential part of advanced 
economies and societies. Yet many complex projects are not implemented fully, or end half-way 
through execution, or else are plagued by conflicts, litigations and scandals, by significant cost 
and schedule overruns, by widespread dissatisfaction with their activities, final form, functions 
and benefits, and sometimes by accidents with catastrophic consequences for people, nature and 
societies. The project management discipline seized upon various perspectives and developed 
new approaches attempting to explain and address deviations from what it considers the normal 
course of a project. These attempts have recently produced a deep reconceptualization of project 
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processes, knowledge production, stakeholder management, contractual design, risk 
management, as well as organizational governance, flexibility and reliability.  
One problem with these attempts is their low integration; each of them relies on different 
assumptions and they often produce recommendations that contradict each other and the basic 
tenets of project management. For example, some recommended contractual designs create 
problems with knowledge production and organizational flexibility, while others hamper cost 
control and organizational governance (Floricel & Miller, 2001). Researchers have tried various 
ways of bringing these approaches to a common denominator, by conceptualizing projects as 
organizations in their own right or, more recently, by adopting a practice perspective on project 
management. But these integration efforts are themselves plagued by heterogeneous assumptions 
and methodological foci (Floricel, Bonneau, Aubry & Sergi, 2014), producing polyphony rather 
than dialogue and slowing down theory development. 
 This essay attempts to provide a common ground for the efforts to re-conceptualize 
project management by seeking inspiration in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1821/1966) in order to reassess some deep seated assumptions of the discipline. In essence, 
traditional assumptions depict project management as using knowledge about user needs, natural 
environments, technical objects and human behavior in order to produce, through rational 
selection, decision, problem-solving and optimization processes, a series of prospective 
representations of project form (architectural and design depictions, technical drawings, site 
maps, production flowcharts etc.), resources and activities (goals, development processes, Gantt 
charts, budgets, risk matrices etc.), and organization (hierarchical charts, contracts, rules and 
procedures etc.). These representations then become a teleological engine (Van de Ven & Poole, 
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1995) that drives implementation activities. Managing projects amounts to monitoring and 
correcting deviations from these prospective representations (Floricel, Banik & Piperca, 2013).  
Our inquiry originated in the incongruence we felt between this depiction and the reality 
we perceived while studying complex projects, characterized by multiple iterations, deceptive 
embellishments or even Machiavellian manipulations of representations, as well as conflicts, 
heated debates and tentative commitments between participants, that together with events that 
appeared as unexpected in light of participants’ representations produced endless changes in 
project form, organization and activities. These observations suggested us that representations do 
not drive projects; they are merely a temporary truce under pressure from a heterogeneous and 
constantly shifting nexus of interests and forces. Following Schopenhauer, we term this nexus 
‘will’ and argue that current thinking in project management misinterprets its nature and 
underestimates its role. Inspired again by Schopenhauer, we also argue that representations are 
not mirror depictions of surrounding realities and future projects. Instead they are constructed at 
various levels, including in manipulative ways, and are used strategically to advance interests 
and activities. This enables us to argue that project management is the process of bringing and 
keeping together numerous heterogeneous and evolving strands of ‘will’ and ‘representation’, 
and attempting to master the wildly emergent, rather than teleological, nature of this process.  
 We hope that by clarifying the complementary categories of ‘will’ and ‘representation’ in 
relation to issues encountered in complex projects, we provide an explicit worldview and 
parsimonious set of fundamental concepts around which project management scholars could 
articulate their theorizing efforts. The specific contribution we expect is to help integrate a series 
of fundamental concerns of project management researchers, starting with the understanding of 
complexity and processes (Cooke-Davies, Cicmil, Crawford & Richardson, 2007; Whitty & 
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Maylor, 2009), and ending with the recent interest in practice and actor-networks, including the 
renewed interest in the role of materiality and the calls for a symmetric treatment of human and 
nonhuman ‘actors’ (Latour, 1991; Barad, 2003; Orlikowski, 2007). In turn, this will hopefully 
enable the integration of various applied and practical developments to which we alluded above. 
We begin this conceptual development by introducing, in the next section, the concepts of 
will and representation as reflected in Schopenhauer’s philosophical works, and by showing how 
these concepts can be seen as extending, directly or indirectly, into some current thinking in 
organization theory and the project management field. The last section of the paper discusses the 
implications for project management research and practice. 
 
Understanding ‘will’ and ‘representation’ 
 
In 1818, German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer published a book whose title is most often 
translated in English as “The World as Will and Representation” (Schopenhauer, 1966). The 
book sought to answer questions about our relation to the world that went back at least to Plato 
and Aristotle. In particular, Schopenhauer argued that our subjective relation to the world is, on 
the one hand, a ‘representation’ constructed by our cognitive faculties, and, on the other hand, a 
‘will’ that works through our inner desires and sentiments. Rather than proposing a new dualism, 
he sees these two aspects as intertwined. In fact, the main reason we return almost 200 years 
back is that subsequent philosophical works emphasized one aspect at the expense of the other. 
On the one hand, phenomenology (Husserl, 1913/1931; Heidegger, 1927/1962) and logical 
empiricism (Bunge, 1996) seem equally concerned with the ‘representation’ side of being in the 
world, while, on the other hand, Nietzsche, existentialists and even materialists appear to 
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emphasize ‘will,’ be it as freedom or as necessity. We sought a perspective that balances these 
two aspects because we came to the conclusion that they are inextricably linked and play an 
equal role in projects. With such a perspective we hope to overcome a certain disconnect 
between in these aspects in the project management field. While the official project management 
discourse, backed by literatures rooted in decision theory, economics and optimization (Winch 
1989; Chapman & Ward, 1996; Brucker et al., 1999), emphasizes the rational construction and 
embodiment of systemic and structural representations, the informal, everyday discourse of 
managers, with some support in the literature on the “human side of project management” 
(House, 1988), often strays into discussing volitional and emotional aspects and the interpersonal 
efforts needed to keep the project alive and enable effective action.  
Schopenhauer’s ideas suggest not just a path towards restoring the balance and enabling 
the integration of these aspects, but also a parsimonious set of distinctions, which, with proper 
interpretation and actualization, could provide a conceptual kernel for rethinking the nature of 
project management. We begin by discussing the ‘representation’ aspect, before clarifying the 
particular meaning of the term ‘will’. The section ends with a discussion of the interaction 
between ‘will’ and ‘representation’. In each subsection, we outline recent developments that 
echo Schopenhauer’s views as well as implications for the understanding of project management. 
 
Representation 
Following Kant, Schopenhauer argues that our representation of the world presupposes certain a 
priori cognitive faculties, the most basic of which are the capacities to represent time, space and 
causality. Because of this, while admitting that there is a reality out there (a “thing” in itself) and 
that representations are an immediate correlate of this reality, Schopenhauer argues that the 
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constructed nature of representations precludes us from knowing the true nature of this reality 
based on our perceptual sensations, or on our abstract ideas. In particular, we cannot assume that 
this reality has the same properties of space, time and causality inherent in our representations of 
the world as a priori forms of our sensibility. The constructed nature of representation concerns 
the immediate perception of the world, but even more so other representations, in particular 
abstract conceptualizations, which are all conditioned by the immediate perception.  
Subsequent inquiries into the nature of immediate perception support the idea of a 
constructed representation of reality. Physics-inspired thinkers were intrigued by our perception 
of the world. Of particular interest were time and space, namely why introspection into the way 
we perceive the world tells us that space should be represented with three dimensions and time 
should be considered a separate dimension, while physical theories and mathematical formalisms 
could add any number of dimensions and consider time as one among them. Poincaré (1912) 
argued that this particular structure stems from the biological structure of our cognitive 
apparatus, and surmised the existence of a faculty that enables us to construct physical and 
mathematical continuums, and also enables us to construct ‘spaces’ with different number and 
configuration of dimensions. Rashevsky (1935, p. 75), the founder of a field called mathematical 
biophysics, even attempted to imagine “what the physico-chemical structure of organisms must 
be so that they would choose for their frames of reference our three-dimensional space and one-
dimensional time,” warning that “this structure must itself be described in non-spatial and non-
temporal terms.” Biology-inspired thinkers extended this line of thought to argue that such innate 
‘distortions’ are adaptations that ensure our survival, among others, by focusing our attention on 
certain aspects of reality and excluding others. Maturana and Varela (1980) proposed the concept 
of autopoiesis, as the tendency of some systems to reproduce the relations that sustain their 
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existence. The ‘perception’ of autopoietic systems refers to the system itself, by selecting only 
those external features that are of interest in relation to system survival. For example, unaided 
human perception only represents a range of wavelengths in the electromagnetic or sound 
spectrums, as well as objects and processes in a limited range of size, proximity and speed. In 
other words, we construct a world of our ‘size’ and ‘likeness,’ which, among others, translates 
into safety and ergonomic concerns for project site equipment operation, and for the design of 
projects from military aircraft to information systems (Shneiderman, 1979).        
Psychologists and neural scientists provide more evidence in support of the constructed 
nature of our representations. For example, they found a powerful ability to set apart objects 
from ground, or to discern the features and expressions of other people. For gestalt psychologists 
and neurobiologists, these abilities amount to an active construction of the world by our brain 
(Kohler, 1938; Wertheimer, 1938; Maunsell, 1995; Zeki, 1992). A first operation involved in 
“seeing with the brain” enables us to spontaneously see objects as an instantiation of a category. 
Many such categories, including social ones, point to the function of an object or to the way it 
affects the subject (Polanyi, 1966; Dreyfus, 1991; Rosch, 1978). Perceiving objects directly as 
meaningful, for instance as a friend or a foe, is an adaptation that enables us to react more 
quickly to dangers. A second constructive “distortion” that our brain performs almost 
automatically is putting objects in relation (Anderson, 1980; Damasio, 1989), such as 
apprehending their relative position, sequence, movement, or causal influence. The two 
operations are not only basic, but also independent, as suggested by the fact that our brain uses 
separate neural circuits to perform them (Kandel, 2006). 
According to Schopenhauer, our representation of the world also involves the ability to 
create and operate with abstract categories. In line with the rational views mentioned above, this 
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uniquely human ability to “withdraw into reflection,” in a “sphere of calm deliberation” away 
from the “storms of reality” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 85) is the key to planning future actions and 
increasing our control over the world. However, he also argues that abstract concepts are rooted 
in our perception of the world and, hence, are conditioned by the operations that construct this 
perception. Besides, while perception gives us a direct and, in some sense, infallible grasp of the 
world, abstract representations are prone to errors with regard to the meaning of concepts and the 
relations between them. These ideas are echoed by epistemological perspectives that see only a 
loose correspondence between abstract constructs and the reality “out there,” from those insisting 
on the primacy of the logical structure of a network of concepts over its correspondence with the 
sensations we get from reality (Bunge, 1996), to those observing that conceptual nets “impinge 
on reality only at the margins” (Quine, 1951), or not at all, as concepts derive meaning from their 
relation to each other (Wittgenstein, 1953).  
Such debates are paralleled in the literature on technology by discussions on the role of 
abstract knowledge, such as scientific formulas, in representing and guiding the design concrete 
artifacts, for example in innovation projects. While some authors (Bunge, 1967; Sorenson & 
Fleming, 2004) maintain that abstract knowledge plays an important inspiring and guiding role, 
others (Vincenti, 1990; Nightingale, 1998) argue that abstractions have a hard time capturing the 
complex forms of technical objects, and may even be counterproductive (Kline, 1987). The 
alternative is developing an intuitive understanding of the operation and “affordances” (Gibson 
1977) of relevant concrete objects, through immediate perception and practical experience, such 
as that obtained through repeated prototype trials. A similar debate, with relevance for project 
selection activities, ensued in psychology and decision theory from the finding that decision 
makers systematically deviate from the norms of “substantive rationality” (Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1974). A more adaptive behavior seems to be interacting repeatedly with the 
concrete reality and iteratively improving the representation of the situation rather than seeking 
an optimal decision scheme from the outset (Simon, 1978; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). These 
findings are, perhaps, echoed in the growing popularity of iterative, as opposed to linear, project 
processes, including Scrum (Boehm, 1988; Schwaber, 1997; Shenhar, 2001). 
Human limitations and abilities also explain the widespread production of representations 
on external, material supports, such as paper and computer screens, in the form symbolic 
formulas, drawings, imagery and videos. Some of these representations, such as those provided 
by an electronic microscope or a particle detector, enable us to overcome perceptual limits. But 
the means by which they are produced add another thick constructive layer, via the theoretical 
assumptions incorporated in the design of the relevant devices and practices, even simple ones 
such as optical microscopes (Hacking, 1981; Pickering, 1981). Similar constructive distortions 
operate in the devices investigating soil conditions for a hydroelectric dam project, the size of an 
oilfield for a drilling platform project or the biological processes that justify a drug project.  
Other benefits of external representations are the possibility of preserving impressions 
and abstractions to overcome memory limitations, and of conveying them in time and space to 
overcome the limitations of presence. Moreover, external representations also give feedback on 
imagined objects by letting us glance at their concrete form in the world, and manipulate them in 
ways that mental abilities do not allow. This is particularly useful for architects, engineers and 
industrial designers who, in essence, construct project representations by relying on nonverbal 
thought (Fergusson, 1977; Visser, 2006). Like constructing mental representations, constructing 
external ones involves selection, accentuation, meaning attribution and relational configuration 
(Lynch, 1988), but these distortions are combined with processes of materialization and 
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preservation on external media, which impose their own set of constraints (Latour, 1986). In 
some cases, the process also involves representational conventions that abstract in a particular 
directive way from the richness of perceptual representations (Henderson, 1991; Zasso, 1996). 
These insights in the nature of mental and external representations suggest that knowledge 
production and representation practices in projects do not just passively enhance correspondence 
with a reality out there, but actively construct a reality, via multilayered, partly implicit processes 
of perception, conceptualization, codification and embodiment. The construction seems even less 
anchored and more active when prospective representations, such as project plans and drawings, 
are being produced. Results may differ, depending on specific actors, tools and operations 
involved in these processes, and hence may channel projects on quite different action paths. 
Social processes add another distortive layer to the process of representation construction. 
Theories about the social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 1977), in 
particular the sociology of science, technology and risk (Fleck, 1979; Hughes, 1983; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), imply that rather elaborate processes of collective 
selecting, amplifying, forgetting and legitimizing are enmeshed in the construction of concepts 
and causal attributions used in practice and science. In turn, these influence individual perception 
and action. These theories can help us understand the practices through which the ‘myth’ of 
project viability and worth is built and maintained, but also the strategic practices that encourage 
or limit the access and influence of possible participants in the process, or impact decisions by 
setting the discussion agenda, framing the key issues, legitimating and otherwise structuring the 
field of possible action (Foucault, 1982; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). 
Representations on external, material support play a key role in these processes, first of 
all as vehicles for conveying internal representations, such as project visions or personal and tacit 
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knowledge, to other actors, present in the same room, or located further away in space and time. 
Studies of engineering design and innovation projects suggest that a multitude of representations 
are used, some to synthesize, convey and legitimate knowledge, either existing or produced in 
the course of project activities, while others, to represent requirements, functions, architectures, 
artefact forms and schedules that guide execution; the nature of representations seems to evolve 
from abstract and simple to concrete and complex as the project advances (Floricel, Michela, & 
George, 2011; Chandrasegaran et al., 2013). Research on external representation practices traced 
sequences or networks of representations that converge towards a definitive “inscription” which 
legitimizes the project myth (Henderson, 1999; Latour, 1986). It also elucidated how external 
representations are used to enable collaboration. As “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 
1989; Carlile, 2002) they enable the coordination of planning activities across organizational and 
departmental boundaries by helping create a shared vocabulary and meaning, while as “epistemic 
objects” (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Knorr Cetina, 1997) their joint construction helps integrate 
the contributions of planners working together. A key condition for collaboration seems to be the 
flexibility allowed by various forms of embodiment, say by a pencil and paper sketch compared 
to an electronic database (Henderson, 1991).  
External representations can also be a vehicle for “translating” the project in an attempt to 
attract, tame or repel other actors or to create a “screen” that projects the needed image for 
stakeholders (Callon, 1986). Their morphologic, figurative and symbolic structure, as well as 
their dynamic properties, convey meaning by interacting with actors’ innate perceptual and 
conceptual abilities discussed above. The study of practices involving such representations, from 
written slogans and graphic materials to final artifacts, can illuminate their use as “discursive 
instruments” for influencing others actors (Deetz, Tracy & Simpson, 2000). The selection and 
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active manipulation of representations is also used to project the competence, probity, diligence 
and reliability of the actors that produced them, and hence, to augment their status, legitimacy, 
credibility, and, ultimately, their potential influence on other actors (Floricel, Michela & George, 
2011). For example, during the Polaris system development, PERT charts served, among others, 
to demonstrate the use of modern management practices and hence keep public bureaucrats from 
interfering with the project (Sapolsky, 1972).  
The above discussion reveals that representations could be viewed differently compared 
to the assumptions of the rational paradigm in project management. Rather than being knowledge 
that reflects, albeit imperfectly, the reality surrounding a project, they are distortions resulting 
from biological, psychological and social processes. Instead of providing objective justifications 
for projects, they are used as tools for convincing and manipulating. But even if this richer, albeit 
not unusual view, is adopted, our understanding of projects may suffer from the overemphasis on 
representations imported from the social and organization theories that inform project research. 
These theories have been dominated by phenomenology inspired views regarding the social 
construction of reality and the various forms of institutionalization of structures and practices 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These views had multiple 
echoes in organization theory, from the information processing view (March & Simon, 1958; 
Stinchcombe, 1990), to an emphasis on tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994), routines (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Feldman & Pentland, 2003), sensemaking, identity and heedful behavior (Weick, 
1979; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), and even on ‘practice’ as a corpus of accepted ways of doing 
things (Jarzabkowski, Balogun & Seidl, 2007). Project management has followed the same trend 
(Blomquist, Hällgren, Nilsson & Söderholm, 2010). Only recently have these fields started to 
pay attention to external representations and their organizational role as boundary or epistemic 
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objects (Scarbrough, Panourgias & Nandhakumar, 2015). Also recently, currents such as actor-
network theory, activity theory, sociomateriality and the practice view (Latour, 2005; Engeström, 
2001; Orlikowski, 2007; Nicolini, Mengis & Swan, 2012) started to explore the way social 
interactions are intertwined with various material aspects of the world. We believe that 
Schopenhauer’s concept of ‘will,’ discussed in the next section, opens an avenue for better 
understanding the volitional and material aspects of project management as well as for their 
rebalancing and integration with the representational aspects. 
 
Will 
This second aspect of our relation to the world that Schopenhauer puts forward is related to inner 
sensations such as pain, pleasure, emotion, desire and urges to act. He sees these sensations as 
vehicles through which a fundamental ‘will’ present in the world expresses itself. The intuition 
of these inner states, unencumbered by words and concepts, is for him a way of glimpsing the 
intrinsic nature of the world—a holistic eternal force that manifests itself through a multitude of 
subjects in particular times and places. Another expression of ‘will’ is the never-ending struggle 
for domination between subjects, including that between human and non-human subjects, or with 
non-living forces. Simply put, a multiplicity of subjects are vehicles, at a specific place and time, 
of this universal force, which subjects cannot represent as an object, but which acts through their 
bodies and can be glimpsed via introspection. Contrary to Nietzschean or existentialist views that 
emphasize the autonomy of individual volition, Schopenhauer argues that the feeling of 
individual free will in human subjects is an illusion, enabled by the higher levels of organization 
of the human body.  
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Schopenhauer vision of ‘will’ appears to have been influenced by Hinduism (Nichols, 
1999; White, 2010). Other possible influences are ancient mystical notions, such as Dionysian or 
Bacchic cults in ancient Greece and Rome, which opposed the rational cult of Sun’s god Apollo, 
and whose ceremonies, by diminishing actors’ restraint, let followers express and connect with 
the irrational forces that rule them. These ideas made Schopenhauer a preferred philosopher of 
Romanticism, an intellectual current that, in reaction to Age of Enlightenment with its emphasis 
on knowledge, individual freedom and rationality, rediscovered ancient Nordic myths and their 
beliefs that occult magical forces rule the world (Williamson, 2004).  
In spite of these sources, Schopenhauer’s view is surprisingly compatible with modern 
scientific views of a material world. Thus, Schopenhauer’s always unsatisfied ‘will’ is akin to the 
impetus present in the Universe since, say, the Big Bang, whose nature and origins still elude our 
ability to understand it as a fully re-presentable object. One of the many diffuse consequences of 
this impetus is the development of living organisms, including the human species. Each 
organism can be seen as a temporary nexus of processes in the vast network of transformations 
that this impetus generates in the world. Its particular form is an echo of transformations, such as 
evolutionary adaptation, that follow obscure logics, perhaps as strange as that supposed by 
Dawkins’s (1976) “selfish gene” hypothesis. The peculiarities of this form, including the a priori 
representational abilities and the sensations it produces in subjects, are geared towards the 
survival of the body and the reproduction of its species. 
The idea of a magic underground that influences phenomena in the world in intractable 
ways is also echoed in the modern scientific views. Scientists are still debating fundamental 
properties space, time, energy and matter, as well as the nature of subatomic particles and the 
processes involving them. Current thinking about them includes notions that call in question 
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traditional conceptions of space, time and causality, such as relativity, intrinsic randomness 
(rather than lack of knowledge) and limits to observation. Yet, even with these assumptions, the 
world cannot be explained using a parsimonious set of concepts related in simple ways.  Streams 
of thought attempting such explanations, for example string theory, make strange assumptions, 
so strange that no mathematical apparatus is available to work out any testable hypotheses 
(Greene, 1999). Among others, they postulate entities that lack normal dimensionality but also 
spaces with many additional hidden dimension. What Romantics saw as occult, telluric forces, is 
now the almost infinite potential for surprising discoveries in what Feynman (1960) called 
“plenty of room at the bottom.” 
 But the idea of intractable influences beyond our representation and abstraction abilities 
is also relevant at a more macro, everyday level, and transpires in the debates on complexity, 
emergence and process ontologies. Of the various views on complexity (Biggiero, 2001), closer 
to the concept of ‘will’ appears to be the one focusing on the fact that interactions between 
entities at a lower-level of organization, and/or between their properties, lead to unexpected 
properties in higher-level objects. System philosophers call this possibility ‘emergence’ and 
argue that it gives higher-level entities a distinct ontological status; emergent entities exist in 
their own right (Bunge, 1979; Simon, 1981). Complexity in this sense increases with the extent 
that component aggregation is non-additive and emergent properties cannot be reduced to the 
properties of component entities and of their interactions. In other words, we cannot represent the 
origin and the impetus for many entities that we observe in the world. The nature of emergence 
and non-additivity itself is still the object of heated debate (Wimsatt, 2006). All this gives 
phenomena, including project-relevant ones, such as those related to materials, air or fluid 
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dynamics, and soil, an aura of ‘magic’ despite spectacular advances in science and technology in 
the two centuries since Schopenhauer’s book. 
Added complexity of this type comes from the ‘downward conditioning’ (Kontopoulos, 
1993) that higher levels of organization exert over their components, especially in the sense of 
maintaining the relations that led to their emergence in the first place. Upward from molecules, 
biological entities have been characterized by multiple interactions between up to nine emergent 
levels of organization (Kohl & Noble, 2009, p. 3). The failure to explain and especially to predict 
these phenomena by focusing components such as genes and proteins led to calls for abandoning 
the prevalent reductionist stance in biology and adopting a more systemic, cross-level approach 
(Mayr, 2000; Sauer, Heinemann & Zamboni, 2007; Noble, 2010). In practical terms, this failure, 
relevant for pharmaceutical, biotechnology and biomedical projects, seems to account for the 
extremely low percentage of successful projects, for the low level of success of ‘rational drug 
design’ approaches, and hence, for the continuing prevalence of massive trial and error 
approaches that seek to find a way of tricking the ‘magic underground’ to do what project 
participants want it to do (Nightingale & Martin, 2004; Mandal et al., 2009). 
The ideas of emergence and downward conditioning have also characterized the efforts to 
account for the complexity of social reality. Researchers set apart several aggregation levels, 
from individuals, to teams, organizations (including projects), sectors, nations and global 
systems, but struggle to understand how these interact. While some scholars, particularly 
economists, try to explain the properties of higher level systems by looking at the interactions 
between lower level entities (Axelrod, 1984; Coleman, 1966), others emphasize the influence of 
higher levels on the organization of lower levels (Parsons, 1960; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Luhmann, 1995), while a third group stress mutual influences between various levels (Bourdieu, 
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1977; Giddens, 1984). The diversity of possible interactions may account for the fact that project 
organizations do not obey the tenets of rational design; their emergence from multiple types of 
relations between various types of human and nonhuman entities adds layers of complexity on 
top of those attributable to intractable interactions in their material and biological substrate.   
Another stream of thought that supports the inscrutable and dynamic nature of ‘will’ 
concerns natural and social processes. According to Prigogine (1997, p. 55), we live in a world in 
which “we discover fluctuations, bifurcations and instabilities at all levels.” One line of inquiry 
into processes still considers entities as real and focuses on the conditions and mechanisms that 
produce highly non-linear or chaotic dynamics in the systems of interests (Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995; Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999). Of particular interest are conditions and mechanisms 
through which small, imperceptible differences in initial conditions lead to wildly different 
outcomes, for example for competing innovation projects (Arthur, 1989). But, on the other hand, 
proponents of so called ‘process ontologies’ consider that entities are artifacts of our perception, 
and that events, which make a difference in the world and connect to each other to form 
processes, are the essential elements of the world (Hernes, 2008, p. 45, referring to the work of 
Alfred North Whitehead). Processes are detectable strands of events in a world in continual 
becoming (Hernes & Weik, 2007). Organization scholars influenced by this ontology argue that 
continual becoming is the normal state of organizations and the only way to influence its course 
is by interacting in order to reweave some of the processes (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). This process 
view provides strong arguments against the rational ‘practice’ of attempting to ‘freeze’ project 
deliverables and organizations up front, through plans, organizational charts and contracts; in 
fact it suggests that to manage projects is not to sanction deviations but to embrace and perhaps 
stimulate continuous change processes.        
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Schopenhauer’s argument that perception is conditioned by innate structures, and that we 
perhaps get a more direct access to ‘will’ through bodily sensations, such as emotions, has also 
been supported by subsequent developments. The discovery of unconscious sources of human 
behavior (Freud, 1953), some of which may be deep structures shared across the human species 
(Jung, 1965; Schein, 1985); the mapping of cognitive functions and subjective sensations on 
specific areas and processes in the brain, nervous and other somatic systems (Changeux & 
Dehaene, 1989; Le Doux, 1995; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Kandel, 2006); as well as studies in 
evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Pinker, 1999) all seem to support the idea 
that representations and emotions are the result of the lines of force that express the original 
impulse working through the body. Rather than producing a “mirror” or “true” representation of 
some external reality, evolution developed living forms that harmonize with these lines of force 
by constructing biochemical and physiological ‘representations’ and perceptual sensations and 
by triggering actions, which, in spite of their seeming irrationality, are crucial for maintaining the 
relations that ensure the survival of individuals and species (Maturana & Varela, 1980). The 
implications of these findings for project management research and practice go well beyond the 
tenets of the ‘human side of project management’ current, which opposes a view of project actors 
as malleable and rational executants that can be managed mechanically (Block, 1983; House, 
1988). While relying on psychology, ergonomics and political science to suggest a more nuanced 
understanding of actors, the ‘human side’ perspective still aims to subsume any complications to 
the ‘rational’ project management view, by identifying relevant stimulus-response regularities 
and, from a cognitive perspective, by accounting for intervening biases and distortions. Instead, 
the new views, which correspond better to Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, de-center away from humans, 
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by stressing their complex and multifaceted material and biological roots and by treating human 
and nonhuman entities in a symmetric and inextricably related manner (Latour, 1991). 
The relevance of the ‘concept of will’ for project management is echoed by recent trends 
in research and practice. In a sense, the unpredictable and always becoming nature of the world 
is already captured by the interest in risk, in particular in unforeseen events (Floricel & Miller, 
2001; Sommer & Loch, 2004), and complexity (Shenhar, 2001; Williams, 1999). Research on 
complexity in project management has taken two paths (Geraldi, Maylor & Williams, 2011). One 
aims to take a deeper look at the nature of project complexity, to enable a critical reassessment of 
prescribed project management methods (Whitty & Maylor, 2009), while the other prefers the 
more practical approach of mapping the vast diversity of factors that increase project complexity 
(Bosch-Rekveldt, Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker, & Verbraeck, 2011). These studies can be further 
divided in two strands, one static and the other dynamic, a distinction similar to the one we made 
above (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006). In terms of substantive areas, the inquiry included technical 
aspects (Kim & Wilemon, 2003; Lu & Suh, 2009) as well as the market, social and political 
environment, the networks of contractors and stakeholders, the nature of organizations and teams 
etc. (Floricel, Piperca & Banik, 2011).  
However, we believe that the concept of ‘will’ can improve our understanding of the 
forces at work in project management to a much larger extent than research on complexity has 
been able to do so far. First, it can help us take a fresh look at the broad range of intractable and 
dynamic ways in which materiality intertwines with projects, as suggested by researchers 
interested in sociality with objects (Knorr Cetina, 1997), actor-networks (Callon, 1986), and 
sociomateriality (Barad, 2003; Orlikowski, 2007). In our own research we repeatedly found that, 
despite the availability of statistical knowledge and advanced technical means, project managers 
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had to confront unforeseen soil and weather conditions. Situations in which the support of a 
bridge or the base of a dam could not reach solid rock because they fell on a surprisingly deep 
geological deposit or even on a tectonic fault line are common. Echoing the occult telluric forces 
of Romanticism, it seems that complex projects regularly encounter ‘black swans’ that reveal the 
fragility of past statistical knowledge (Taleb, 2007). Thus, even more common are occurrences 
of biological processes that block the action of drugs for reasons that are impossible to predict or 
even understand, of unsuspecting responses of living organisms and ecosystems involved in or 
affected by projects, as well as of artifacts that stubbornly refuse to behave as designers intended. 
Failures during execution and exploitation, often having severe consequences, or even the 
inability to separate and coordinate work and traffic flows on construction sites are other 
frequent examples. This has inspired some thinkers to argue that a constant risk of technical 
catastrophes and major unintended consequences of innovation and other complex projects is the 
normal state of affairs in modern societies (Beck, 1992; Kenway et al. 2006).  Echoing the 
Romantic-era vision of a magic underground Perrow (1984: 11) argued, after studying the Three 
Miles Island that “socio-technical systems have become so complicated that we cannot anticipate 
all the possible interaction of the inevitable failures; we add safety devices that are deceived or 
avoided or defeated by hidden paths in the system.”  
Given the vast network of material and logical interactions that constitute a project today 
and the abundance of surprising events, the project management field started to emphasize 
practices such as gradual or iterative definition of scope and requirements (MacCormack, 
Verganti & Iansiti, 2001), lean (just-in-time, moderately in advance) planning of activities 
(Ballard & Tommelein, 2012) and agile or improvisational execution (Conforto, Salum, Amaral, 
da Silva, & de Almeida, 2014; Leybourne, 2009); to seek ways to detect early warning signs of 
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project failure (Kappelman, McKeeman & Zhang, 2006); and to increase  the response capacity 
of project organizations (Floricel, Piperca & Banik, 2011). Others have insisted that reducing the 
chances of such events relies on the development of network coordination capabilities (Brusoni, 
Prencipe & Pavitt, 2001) and even to a total reshaping of the institutional framework that 
surrounds the development, execution and exploitation of projects (Leveson et al., 2009). Even 
for projects such as software, information and communication systems, in which designers 
assume that material aspects are under control, and only deal with representations, such as strings 
of bits, they have become concerned with the complexity of representations themselves 
(Tergaden, Sheetz & Monarchi, 1995; Katina, Keating & Jaradat, 2014). Experts struggle to 
define and quantify the static complexity of such virtual systems, often conceptualizing it as the 
difficulty of representing system regularities in a simplified manner, together with the 
computational effort required for retrieving its form with a given degree of precision 
(Kolmogorov, 1965; Gell-Mann & Lloyd, 1996).  
But the concept of ‘will’ can also be used to better understand the role and behavior of 
human actors, beyond the view of selfish opportunism ‘with a guile’ (Williamson, 1981), but still 
calculating and utility maximizing, which economists propose, and towards a much broader 
range of rational and non-rational behavior, driven by urges stemming from actors’ material and 
biological nature. This view can accommodate behavior affected by greed, libido, resentment, 
fatigue, stress, disease, including mental one, the use of alcohol and drugs, etc. Our own research 
on complex projects has revealed frequent conflicts not only with stakeholders such as pressure 
groups and trade unions, but often between participants. These conflicts were often based on 
personal animosity, and sometimes led to threats, violence and other types of criminal behavior, 
and often could be resolved only by removing some of those involved from the project. We also 
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observed how this kind of conflict was exacerbated by unexpected problems related to project 
environment and artefacts. Of course this view can also account for seemingly ‘random’ 
creativity, entrepreneurial brilliance and energy as well as altruism, solidarity and heroism in 
dangerous situations. Despite the recent importance that organization theorists are beginning to 
attach to emotions (Huy, 1999), neural micro-foundations of organizational behavior 
(Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011) and even criminal behavior (Crane, 2013), this range of non-
rational behavior is still rarely considered in project management research (Müller et al., 2013). 
All these aspects uncovered by using the concept of ‘will’ also enable a rethinking of the 
impetus for initiating and carrying forward projects as a diversity of processes conditioned by 
their material substrate. This later condition puts on an equal epistemological footing the human 
and non human beings as well as project artifacts and natural surroundings, which all become 
actors of sorts (Latour, 1991; Law, 2004). Indeed participants’ and stakeholders’ needs, desires, 
intentions as well as fears, urges to act and to dominate, as well as underlying natural processes 
in artifacts and soil, are all expressions of ‘will’ through different vehicles. In rational views, 
some of these expressions translate into goals, functions, value or utility, while others are 
interpreted as costs, constraints and risks. Yet, these translations operate on processes that can 
hardly be understood and represented, such as those that work through the body to ensure 
survival or those that work in project surroundings to produce earthquakes and hurricanes. As a 
result, goals and value are bound to be arbitrary in light of any representation of the world, as 
expressed in such observations as “rules of morality […], are not conclusions of our reason,” 
(Hume, D., 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I, Sect. 1), and “nothing that ought 
to be can be deduced by knowing what is” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 44, italics in the original).  
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A corollary of having such a shaky base is that goals and value assessments by different 
project participants are likely to be in conflict, even when they are couched in altruistic urges or 
when surrogates of causal representation, such as cultural values, social norms and tradition 
serve as justifications (Habermas, 1968). Conflicts force project participants and stakeholders to 
change positions or induce other actors to change theirs. Besides, while a current assessment may 
reflect fundamental forces and longstanding traditions, the dynamic components of survival-
oriented bodily processes constantly react to changing stimuli. In particular, the impetus that 
works through non human and inanimate material substrates will produce events that will be 
perceived as unexpected by project participants (Luhmann, 1993). This will trigger reactions in 
some actors, which will change their goals and assessments of value and will induce other actors 
to change their desires accordingly. Therefore, project goals or technical specifications that “fix” 
these assessments of value can only be taken as temporary representations of untamed and ill 
understood expressions of ‘will’ through subjects. This also means that the teleological engine 
and the linear unfolding patterns, implicit in the dominant plan-then-execute paradigm for 
project management, are not a valid description of project processes, and should be replaced, 
perhaps by dialectic or evolutionary engines and by continuous becoming processes, as well as 
by practices that constantly reassess the context and participants’ goals and attempt to 
continually rebuild the nexus of commitments towards the project. 
 
The relation between ‘will’ and ‘representation’ 
In Schopenhauer’s view, ‘will’ and ‘representation’ are two sides of the same coin, which 
amounts to an automatic link between the two. Hence, he stresses the importance of 
representations in the form of “intuitive, immediate apprehension”, by arguing that “abstract 
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concepts of reason can only serve to handle what is immediately understood […] but never to 
bring about understanding itself” (1966, p. 21). In turn, apprehension is conditioned by the innate 
manifestations of ‘will’. Theories of evolutionary cognition and autopoietic systems, which we 
mentioned before, as well as pragmatism (Simpson, 2009), situated action (Suchman, 1987) and 
activity theory (Leont’ev, 1978), connect ‘will’ to ‘representation’ via the argument that the 
latter is oriented internally, towards inner states and activities that ensure the survival and 
maintenance of the body or other relevant systems. This link is supported by evidence from 
psychology and neurobiology research about the importance of emotions, an expression of ‘will’ 
in subjects, for regulating cognition and adaptive behavior (Zajonc, 1984; Damasio, 1989; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2007). Additional support comes from the importance that scientists, 
including famous physicists such as Einstein and Pauli, give to introspection when attempting to 
understand the world (Miller, 2009). Evidence even shows that “bioregulatory signals, including 
those that constitute feeling and emotion, provide the principal guide for decisions” (Bechara, 
Damasio & Damasio, 2000, p. 307). This may also explain the crucial role of volition, along with 
perceptual abilities and experience, in constructing representations of useful artificial objects, for 
example inventing new operating principles or designing new projects (Mitcham, 1994). 
In turn, perceptual representations of the world and their cognitive processing interact 
with subjects’ volition, triggering evaluative and emotional reactions, and sometimes becoming 
an impetus for action, such as initiating a project. Externalized representations, become objects 
in the world, and have a similar effect by interacting with subjects’ perceptual and understanding 
abilities. For example, the fact that subjects have a visceral reaction to certain types of material 
stimuli is well known, and exploited by marketing experts (Zaltman & Coulter, 1995). But 
subjects also appear to evaluate emotionally abstract representations such as expected values and 
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probability distributions. Hence, in decision experiments, subjects express inordinate preference 
for alternatives that are certain or for menus of alternatives with known probability distributions, 
as opposed to more uncertain distributions (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961). Shifting a 
representation of prospective action outcomes from an achievement that falls short of the 
subject’s aspirations to a possible demise of the subject is accompanied by an emotional shift 
“between hope and fear” (Lopes, 1987). Also, studies of managerial decision-making in natural 
settings show that subjects react to risk as they react to dangers. They do not engage in 
calculations of variance and probabilities, and focus only on the extreme values of the outcome, 
instead of the entire distribution (Shapira, 1995; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). The project 
management domain is just starting to pay attention to this interaction in order to identify the 
kind of representations that can be used to introduce a project to stakeholders and to structure 
public hearings and decisional debates (Lehmann & Motulsky, 2013).    
As a consequence of (i) the constructed nature of representations about the project, its 
context and its viability, and of the additional construction and possible manipulation involved in 
the production of external representations, (ii) the unstable expressions of ‘will’ in human and 
nonhuman actors, and (iii) the many possible interactions between representations and 
expressions of ‘will’ such as goals and perceptions of value, projects are not likely to converge 
towards a static equilibrium of actors’ positions, as assumed implicitly by rational theories, but 
will advance through a constant repositioning and rebuilding process. However, we argue that 
visibility in the social arena stabilizes some project representational elements. Such elements 
include both input assumptions and output representations, such as studies, designs, plans and 
contracts, which are available to most participants, as well as initial positions and, especially, 
resulting commitments, which were made public and are considered to be the tamed or regulated 
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aspect of the participant’s volition. Because they result from lengthy discussions and 
negotiations and changing them sends strong signals about the respective actors and interferes 
with implementation activities, elements in the social arena are likely to remain stable for a 
certain time. Though, behind this screen of stability participants’ representations and expressions 
of will are constantly shifting and the accumulated tensions are always ready so disrupt the 
apparent stability. As a result, outside observers will likely perceive the redefinitions that take 
place in planning as a punctuated equilibrium process. 
 
Instead of conclusions: If Schopenhauer were a project manager 
today … 
 
Some may perceive the preceding discussion as a call for returning to old romantic myths about 
the world and importing them into project management. However, we hope that the arguments 
that we provides suggest quite the contrary, namely taking a more lucid look at the reality of 
project management, one that is informed by the latest discoveries in a whole range of sciences, 
from physics and biology to social sciences, and includes a much broader range of relevant 
aspects. In the process, it may well become evident that, in fact, the current rational-normative 
approaches to project management are based on no more than a myth (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
We used Schopenhauer’s discussion of the world as ‘will’ and ‘representation’ as the kernel that 
not only enabled us to articulate all these discoveries in an integrated and parsimonious 
framework, but also to rebalance what we saw as an excess of attention to cognitive and 
representational aspects as the expense of material and volitional aspects. In more concrete terms 
we believe that this framework enables reconsidering various aspects of project management 
from new perspectives.  
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First, this framework allows for rethinking project organizations in a way that includes a 
much broader range of ways in which people are connected, by including not only rules, charts 
and plans, or routines and interaction scripts, but also physical attraction, repulsion, threats and 
force, as well as material objects, from forms to be filled and information systems that embody 
power differentials through pre-set access rights; to surveillance systems, alleys, walls and fences 
that constrain, warn or isolate people; and to tools that embody past experience and convey it 
across time and space. 
Second, rethinking the role of representations, in particular those on external supports, in 
their various hypostases, from project ‘translations’ that convince and ‘attract’ actors to projects, 
securing convergence and commitment, inspiring and guiding action; to distorted constructions 
that mislead and cause problems; and to artefacts that can be manipulated for illicit gain and used 
for window-dressing to fend off surveillance. From this perspective, planning no longer can be 
seen as the construction of an objective and integrated, albeit evolving, representation of the 
future project, but rather as a distributed process of bricolage that struggles to accommodate 
opposing interests, conflicting institutional logics and disparate sensemaking strands, to create 
some sort of assemblage, often from accidental, marginal and reused components, and hold it 
together by way of narratives and rhetoric (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001;  Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005).  
Third, this framework argues squarely that project participants are biological and material 
beings, evolving in a material world that acts in ways that cannot be totally understood, and that 
conditions their urges, perceptions and cognitions in significant yet not completely tractable 
ways. This would perhaps enable the inclusion of a much broader range of desires, behaviors and 
actions in the range of the normal (which does not mean that all of them are condoned), and 
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hence develop theories that enable managers to better prepare for their occurrence rather than 
relegating them to problems and unexpected events. This would also call for considering 
multiple levels at which the various aspects of the world interact and condition each other. 
Fourth, this framework suggests that our thinking of projects should be much more 
dynamic, in fact, extremely dynamic. As mentioned above, projects are a more or less connected 
nexus of processes, in which a variety of manifestations of ‘will’ connect and collide in multiple 
ways. Stabilizing elements are scant, and over-enforcing them is probably counterproductive, as 
constantly shifting stimuli and volitions may cause the outburst of accumulating tensions. 
Projects are thus better seen as continually changing or becoming. Some groups of 
representations and associated manipulations and rhetoric may play a temporary stabilizing role, 
which would enable advances in planning and execution in ways that are somewhat under 
control. But such representations more likely amount to ill-assembled rafts floating on the 
agitated sea of ‘will’. As a consequence, our vision of project management should shift from that 
of maintaining a straight line, like a liner would do on an ocean by correcting deviations from the 
preset trajectory, towards one of a collective struggle of maintaining convergence and 
advancement while dealing with representational inconsistencies and aberrations, as well as with 
the constant shifts and conflicts in the manifold manifestations of ‘will’.      
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